In several of my recent posts, I laid out my case for how it might not undermine all of economic thinking to find that people aren’t necessarily rational. One of my key points was that you can model irrationality as rationality, but this does raise the question: What good are models in the first place? [...]

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Economics, Information, Logic, Symmetry by Paul Ganssle

On Friday, I explored the fact that predictable irrationality can be viewed as rationality, but the fact that these things are essentially isomorphic really leads to the disturbing implication that it might not be possible to resolve the question of whether or not we are rational actors. What I am seeing in the literature is [...]

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Economics, Rationality by Paul Ganssle

In yesterday’s post, I talked about how people don’t actually need to be rational in order for rational choice theory to be a good way of describing and predicting their behavior. I would put forth that the reason for this is that although there is asymmetry in a superficial dimension (the actual reasons that people [...]

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Economics, Game Theory, Rationality, Symmetry by Paul Ganssle